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We present a device independent quantum secret sharing scheme in arbitrary even dimension. We
propose a d-dimensional N-partite linear game, utilizing a generic multipartite higher dimensional
Bell inequality, a generalization of Mermin’s inequality in the higher dimension. Probability to
win this linear game defines the device independence test of the proposed scheme. The security
is proved under causal independence of measurement devices and it is based on the polygamy
property of entanglement. By defining ǫcor-correctness and ǫ
c-completeness for a quantum secret
sharing scheme, we have also shown that the proposed scheme is ǫcor-correct and ǫ
c-complete.
INTRODUCTION
Quantum physics pledges the security of cryptographic
protocols from an adversary having unbounded compu-
tational power. The journey of quantum cryptography
was started in 1984, when Bennett and Brassard [1] pro-
posed a Quantum Key distribution (QKD) protocol to
share a common secret key between two distant users in
a quantum mechanical way. Although it has been proven
that the BB84 QKD protocol [1] is unconditionally se-
cure [2, 3], but the practical implementation of QKD
confronted side channel attacks in which classical infor-
mation gets leaked [4–6]. To avert these type of attacks
Mayers and Yao [7] proposed the idea of device inde-
pendence in which the security of a scheme is based on
a statistical test performed on the inputs and outputs
of two spatially separated measurement devices. Since
then numerous proposals [8–18] have been suggested for
device independent QKD (DI-QKD). Although, recently
researchers were became interested to explore device in-
dependent security outside QKD [19–25], but it is very
little known till today. A statistical test based on the
quantum violation of Bell inequality [26] is performed for
the security of DI-QKD. Nowadays, quantum cryptogra-
phy is observant of more multipartite higher dimensional
schemes. Such schemes can be proven secure under de-
vice independence paradigm by employing the higher di-
mensional multi-particle Bell inequality.
Quantum nonlocality is evident by measuring two
entangled particles in two spatially separated regions.
Bell [26] showed that the quantum correlations obtained
by measuring two spatially separated entangled particles,
can not be reproduced by local realism. Allowing more
flexibility in local measurements than original Bell in-
equality; Clauser, Horne, Shimony, and Holt [27] pro-
posed an inequality (CHSH inequality) which is maxi-
mally violated when each particle of a two-dimensional
bipartite maximally entangled state is measured by two
mutually unbiased bases. Then it was a natural question
to generalize Bell inequality for a multipartite and/or
multidimensional system. Mermin [28] derived such a
violation for arbitrarily many qubits and showed that
the degree of violation increases exponentially with the
number of involved particles. Ardehali [30], Roy and
Singh [29], Belinskii and Klyshko [31] pursued in this
direction further. Generalization of Bell inequality for
the bipartite multidimensional system has been investi-
gated in [32–36]. The long-awaited proof of the violation
of Bell type correlations in a higher dimensional multi-
partite system was presented by Son et al. [37]. However,
that was further generalized for more than two possible
settings in the measurement device [38, 39]. The applica-
tions of multipartite arbitrary dimensional Bell inequal-
ity in quantum information science is still to explore.
After QKD, quantum secret sharing (QSS) is the most
remarkable example of quantum advantages. QSS is an
adaption of classical secret sharing scheme [40] in the
quantum world. In a secret sharing scheme, there is a
dealer who wants to share a secret among a number of
participants in such a way that only a set of authorized
participants can recover the secret. Hillery et al. [41]
first proposed a QSS scheme using three-particle and
four particle GHZ states of qubits. After that a large
number of schemes on QSS have been proposed such
as circular QSSs [44–46], dynamic QSSs [47, 48], single
particle QSSs [49, 50], graph state QSSs [51–53], verifi-
able QSSs [54–56] and QSSs based on error correcting
codes [42, 57], phase shift operations [58–60] and quan-
tum search algorithms [61]. Gogioso [62] proposed de-
vice independent quantum secret sharing scheme using
Mermin-type contextuality. Although, it was initially
claimed that the scheme is provably secure against non-
signaling attackers but later it confronted some errors in
the proof of main result [62]. Our proposal is indepen-
dent and very different from that proposal.
In this current draft, we have presented a device in-
dependent quantum secret sharing scheme in arbitrary
even dimension. To design device independence test of
the proposed scheme we have introduced an N -partite d-
dimensional linear game based on the Bell violation [37].
It has been shown that to share and recover the secret
securely, it is sufficient to pass the testing phase of the
proposed scheme which is directly related to the win-
ning probability of the proposed game. Security depends
on the polygamy property of entanglement, which states
that an N -partite GHZ state cannot be shared among
2more than N parties [63]. By defining the notions of ǫcor-
correct and ǫc-complete QSS scheme, we have derived
the correctness and completeness of the proposed scheme.
Completeness and security is proved under causal inde-
pendence assumption on measurement devices. As per
our best knowledge, this is the first quantum crypto-
graphic scheme that uses higher dimensional multipartite
Bell inequality to prove security in the device indepen-
dent paradigm.
N-PARTITE d-DIMENSIONAL XOR GAME
N -partite d-dimensional Bell Inequality: In this sec-
tion, we have proposed a linear game depending on the
multipartite arbitrary dimensional Bell inequality pro-
posed by Son et al. [37] with a slight modification. The
detailed discussion can be found in Appendix A. Let us
consider the scenario that, each of N observers indepen-
dently chooses one of two variables (denoted by P0,j and
P1,j for the j
th observer), each of which takes a value
from a set generated by the dth root of unity ω over
complex field. The corresponding Bell function is given
by:
B = 1
2N
d−1∑
n=1
〈
N∏
j=1
(Pn0,j + ω
−n2 Pn1,j)
〉
+C. C., (1)
where C. C. stands for complex conjugate.
From the classical viewpoint, the symbol 〈·〉 denotes
the statistical average over many runs. The theory of
local realism implies that,
B ≤

d(2−
N
2 + 2−1)− 1, if N and d both are even
d(2−
N+1
2 + 2−1)− 1, if N is odd and d is even
d− 1, otherwise
In case of quantum mechanical description, the sta-
tistical average is replaced by quantum average on a
given state |ψ〉. The quantum expectation of B takes
the maximum value (d − 1). One can clearly see that
the constraint on B imposed by local realism is vio-
lated by quantum mechanics for an even dimensional
system. In particular, the maximum quantum viola-
tion is reached by a maximally entangled state |ψ〉 =
1√
d
∑d−1
α=0 |α〉1 |α〉2 . . . |α〉N , and for the observable oper-
ators Pxk,k =
∑d−1
α=0 ω
α |α〉xkxk 〈α| , where xk ∈ {0, 1},
|α〉0 =
∑d−1
β=0 ω
−αβ |β〉, |α〉1 =
∑d−1
β=0 ω
−(α− 12 )β |β〉 and
|α〉 is the eigen vector of generalized Z operator corre-
sponding to the eigen value ωα. In the case of two di-
mensions, the observable operators P0,k and P1,k will be
reduced to Pauli X and Y operators. Thus one can call
the observable operators P0,k and P1,k as generalized X
and Y operator. Now, we can rewrite B as:
B = 1
2N−1
d−1∑
n=1
∑
x∈{0,1}N
ω−nf(x)
〈
N∏
j=1
Pnxj ,j
〉
,
where xi ∈ {0, 1} is the ith bit of x and ω⊥ = 0 f :
{0, 1}N → {0, 1, . . . , d − 1,⊥} is a function such that
it takes the value ⊥ for a x ∈ {0, 1}N , if the binary
representation of x contains odd no of 1’s and f(x) =
j, if the no of 1’s in the binary representation of x is
2j(mod 2d).
Proposal of the game: Let us consider an XOR game
between N spatially separated players Bob1, Bob2, . . .,
BobN who are not allowed to communicate during the
game. The players can communicate before the game
starts and discuss their strategy (or send physical sys-
tems to each other). Now, for each k ∈ [N ] (where
[N ] = {1, . . . , N}), a question xk ∈ {0, 1} is asked to
a player Bobk uniformly at random and independent to
the questions x1, . . ., xk−1, xk+1, . . ., xN asked to the
other players. Bobk gives an answer ak ∈ {0, 1, . . . , d−1}
to a question xk. The players will win the game if
N⊕
i=1
ai = f(x1, . . . xN ),
where the function f is the same function defined as
above and
⊕
is used to define the addition modulo d.
It is obvious that, they will never win the game when
f(x1, . . . , xn) = ⊥.
Quantum strategy to win the game: Before the game
starts, players Bob1, Bob2, . . ., BobN share an N -partite
d-dimensional GHZ state |ψ〉 = ∑d−1α=0 |α〉1 |α〉2 . . . |α〉N .
Here, the suffixes clarify that Bobk (k ∈ [N ]) holds the
kth particle of |ψ〉. For a question xk ∈ {0, 1}, Bobk
measures his particle with the observable Pxk,k and gets
the eigen value ωak as a measurement result. Then Bobk
outputs ak as an answer to the question xk.
Probability to win the game: We will calculate the
probability to win the game pw using the approach of
Murta et al. [64]. As the question xk is chosen from
{0, 1} uniformly at random, then Pr(x1, . . . , xN ) = 2−N .
Now,
pw =
∑
x∈{0,1}N
Pr(x1, . . . , xN ) Pr
(
N⊕
i=1
ai = f(x1, . . . , xN )|x1, . . . , xN
)
= 2−N
d−1∑
j=o
∑
x∈{0,1}N
s.t. f(x)=j
Pr
(
N⊕
i=1
ai = j|x1, . . . , xN
)
+2−N
∑
x∈{0,1}N
s.t. f(x)=⊥
Pr
(
N⊕
i=1
ai = ⊥|x1, . . . , xN
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
Let us consider the Abelian group Zd. Now, we can
apply the Fourier transform on Zd and rewrite the success
3probability pw as
pw =
1
d

1 + 2−N
d−1∑
j=0
∑
x∈{0,1}N
s.t. f(x)=j
d−1∑
n=1
χn(j)
〈
A
n
x1,1
. . . A
n
xN,N
〉

 ,
(2)
where〈
A
n
x1,1
. . . A
n
xN,N
〉
=
∑
a1,...,aN∈Zd
χn(a1) . . . χn(aN ) Pr(a1, . . . , aN |x1, . . . , xN )
and χn’s are the characters of the Abelian group Zd as-
sociated with the game. In particular, χn(j) = ω
−nj.
Quantum strategy to win the game is defined by the
set of projective measurements {P a1x1,1}, . . ., {P aNxN ,N}
being performed on a N -partite entangled state |ψ〉.
In this case, the generalized correlators are defined by〈
Anx1,1 . . . A
n
xN ,N
〉
= 〈ψ|Anx1,1 . . . AnxN ,N |ψ〉 , where the
operators Anxk,k are defined as
Anxk,k =
d−1∑
ak=0
χn(ak)P
ak
xk,k
= (Pxk,k)
n.
Here we have used Pxk,k =
∑d−1
ak=0
ωakP akxk,k. Thus,〈
Anx1,1 . . . A
n
xN ,N
〉
=
〈
Pnx1,1 . . . P
n
xN ,N
〉
. (3)
Finally, by substituting (3) in (2), we get
pw =
1
d

1 + 2−N ∑
x∈{0,1}N
d−1∑
j=0
d−1∑
n=1
ω
−nf(x)
〈
P
n
x1,1
. . . P
n
xN,N
〉
=
1
d
(
1 +
1
2
(d− 1)
)
.
The final equality follows from the fact that ω⊥ = 0
and the Bell function B attains its maximum quantum
value when a maximally entangled state |ψ〉 is measured
by generalized X or Y operators uniformly at random.
As for an even d, the constraint on classical expectation
value of B is violated by quantum mechanics thus the
probability to win the game by using above quantum
strategy will be greater than any classical strategy.
One may note that for d = N = 2; pw =
3
4 , which
does not match the CHSH-value as the function B does
not generalize CHSH function [27], it actually generalizes
the Mermin’s function [28] in arbitrary dimension. Thus,
the winning probability of the game introduced in this
study fails to generalize the same of CHSH game. It
remains an open question to generalize the exact CHSH
inequality [27] for a d-dimensional N -partite system with
two possible measurement settings.
THE PROTOCOL
In this section, we will use the game introduced in the
previous section to propose a device independent quan-
tum secret sharing scheme (DI-QSS). In this scheme, a
dealer Alice wants to share a classical secret among N−1
participants Bob1, Bob2, . . ., BobN−1 in such a way that
only all of the Bobs together can recover the secret. In
particular, Alice’s secret S ∈ Zd, where d is even. Be-
fore describing the proposed scheme, we first enumerate
a minimal set assumptions determining the security of
the scheme.
Assumptions:
1. Alice and Bobs’ laboratories are perfectly isolated
from outside (in particular from Eve) such that any
unintended information cannot go outside the labs.
2. Each party holds a trusted random number gener-
ator.
3. Each of Alice and Bob1, Bob2, . . ., BobN−1 has a
measurement device in their laboratory with two
inputs. Each input has d outputs. The measure-
ment devices are causally independent. Otherwise,
the measurement devices are arbitrary and there-
fore could be prepared by an eavesdropper.
The proposed scheme can be divided into two phases.
Where the first phase guarantees the device indepen-
dence, the second phase shares and reconstructs the se-
cret.
1. For every round i ∈ [M ]:
• A dealer Alice and N − 1 participants Bob1, . . ., BobN−1 shares an N -partite d-dimensional GHZ state
|ψ〉i =
(
1√
d
d−1∑
α=0
|α〉1 . . . |α〉N
)
i
,
where d is an even positive integer.
• Alice picks a random bit Ti with Pr(Ti = 1) = µ and publicly communicates the choice of Ti with Bobs.
• For Ti = 1, Alice randomly picks xi ∈ {0, 1} and for each k ∈ [N ], Bobk picks yki ∈ {0, 1} uniformly at
random. They input xi, y1i, . . ., y(N−1)i to the respective measurement devices and record the outputs a
4ai, b1i, . . ., b(N−1)i respectively. Then Alice and Bobs announce their input and output pairs. They define
a random variable Ci by,
Ci =
{
1, if they win the N-partite d dimensional XOR game,
0, otherwise
2. Testing: Alice and Bobs calculate C = 1∑
i Ti
(∑M
i=0 Ci
)
. They abort the scheme if C < pw − η, where η is the
noise tolerance. Otherwise, they proceed to the next steps to share and reconstruct the secret.
3. Sharing the secret: For each i ∈ [M ] such that Ti = 0, each of Alice and Bobs measures their particle with
generalized X-operator i.e., inputs 0 to their measurement devices and stores their output as SAi , SB1i , . . .,
SB(N−1)i respectively. Suppose Alice’s secret corresponding to the round i is Si ∈ Zd, then she calculates
S´i = Si
⊕
SAi and announces S´i.
4. Secret recovery: Bobs calculate Sˆi = (S´i
⊕N−1
k=1 SBki) and gets the secret Si.
5. Error correction: Alice picks a hash function h(·) from a family of two-universal hash functions uniformly at
random. She computes a dit-string Z of length ǫEC by applying h(·) on the string of secrets and sends Z to Bobs
together with the choice of the hash function h(·). Bobs verify the hash value calculated from their recovered
secret with the hash value sent by Alice. If it matches, they consider the recovered secret as the dealer’s secret.
Otherwise, they discard the secret.
Scheme 1. Proposed Device Independent Quantum Secret Sharing Scheme (DIQSS)
CORRECTNESS, COMPLETENESS AND
SECURITY ANALYSIS
Correctness: After passing the testing phase of the
proposed scheme, each of Alice and Bobs holds a par-
ticle of an N -partite d-dimensional GHZ state |ψ〉i cor-
responding to the round i ∈ [M ] with Ti = 0. Af-
ter measuring their own particle along with generalized
X-operator they get a measurement results as SAi and
SBki (for k ∈ [N − 1]) with a nonzero probability if⊕N−1
k=1 SBki = −SAi. This condition contributes to re-
cover shared secret perfectly. So, we can state the fol-
lowing theorem:
Theorem 1. In the absence of effective eavesdropping
the dealer’s secret can be perfectly reconstructed by the
participants for an honest implementation of secret dis-
tribution and recovery phase of the proposed scheme.
Definition 1. A quantum secret sharing scheme is called
′correct′, if, for any strategy of the adversary, Sˆ = S,
where S is the dealer’s secret and Sˆ is the secret recovered
by the participants. It is called ǫcor-correct, if it is ǫcor-
indistinguishable from a correct protocol.
Theorem 2. The proposed scheme is ǫcor-correct for a
choice of the length of hash value ǫEC such that ǫEC ≥
logd
(
1
ǫcor
)
.
Completeness: A QSS scheme is called complete if the
probability to abort the scheme is very small in case of
an honest implementation of the scheme. By the term
′honest implementation′, we mean that none of the par-
ties deviate from the scheme and there is no eavesdrop-
ping.
Definition 2. A quantum secret sharing scheme is called
ǫc-complete if there exists an honest implementation of
the scheme such that the probability of aborting the
scheme is less than ǫc.
In the next result, we show that the condition of being
the proposed scheme ǫc-complete depends on the noise
tolerance η, the total number of rounds M and the frac-
tion (µ) of rounds chosen for the testing phase.
Theorem 3. The proposed scheme is ǫc-complete for
ǫc ≥ (1− µ(1 − exp(2η2)))M + η.
Security: The security of the proposed QSS scheme
is based on a property of quantum entanglement called
polygamy which states that all maximally entangled
states are (classically and quantically) uncorrelated with
any other system [63]. First, one can use the correlations
obtained in the testing phase of the proposed scheme to
guarantee that the shared entangled state is of the form
|ψ〉 = ∑d−1α=0 |α〉1 . . . |α〉N . Then based on the polygamy
property of entanglement, it concludes that these cor-
relations must be independent of any information that
the eavesdropper Eve can obtain. This ensures the secu-
rity of all measurement devices (held by Alice and Bobs).
As the statistical state is performed with a set of entan-
gled particles and the remaining particles are used to dis-
5tribute and recover the secret, then the security is highly
dependent on the following theorem.
Theorem 4. For large M , Alice and Bobs can proceed
for the share distribution and reconstruction phases se-
curely, if the testing phase of the proposed scheme is suc-
cessful.
The above discussions conclude that qualifying the
testing phase is sufficient for the security of the proposed
scheme. We refer Appendix B for the detailed proof of
above theorems.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
We have presented a device independent quantum se-
cret sharing scheme in the arbitrary even dimension. An
N -partite d-dimensional XOR game has been proposed
utilizing the violation of generic N -partite d-dimensional
Bell inequality. One obvious generalization is to enhance
the scheme to any (even or odd) dimension. As we have
described earlier that the proposed game does not gen-
eralize the CHSH game. So, it remains an open ques-
tion that, how to propose a multipartite CHSH game
in arbitrary dimension by using a variant of multipar-
tite higher dimensional Bell inequality with two possi-
ble measurement settings. Device independence test is
based on the winning probability of the proposed lin-
ear game. We have shown that this testing phase is
enough to ensure that, the entangled particles are in the
desired form and measurement devices are also indepen-
dent from any eavesdropper. The security of the scheme
is based on the polygamy property of entanglement which
states that an N -partite maximally entangled state can-
not be distributed among more thanN parties. Introduc-
ing the definition of ǫcor-correctness and ǫ
c-completeness
for quantum secret sharing scheme, we have shown that
the proposed secret sharing scheme is ǫcor-correct and
ǫc-complete. But, for the sake of security and complete-
ness, we have assumed that the measurement devices are
causally independent. This scheme can be improved by
relaxing the causal independence assumption and pro-
pose a fully device independent quantum secret shar-
ing scheme. Finally, we also remark that the proposed
scheme can be easily adopted for the other variants of
multipartite higher dimensional Bell inequality.
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APPENDIX A: BELL INEQUALITIES FOR
MULTIPARTITE ARBITRARY EVEN
DIMENSIONAL SYSTEM
Son et al. [37] have proposed generic Bell inequalities
for multipartite arbitrary dimensional system. As in the
case of a two-dimensional bipartite system, quantum me-
chanics outperforms the constraint on the correlations
between subsequent measurements on the particles given
by any local realistic theory for a multipartite arbitrary
even dimensional system. Let us consider the scenario
that, each of N observers independently chooses one of
two variables (denoted by Aj and Bj for the j
th ob-
server), each of which takes a value from a set generated
by the dth root of unity ω over complex field. The generic
Bell function presented in [37] is:
B˜ = 1
2N
d−1∑
n=1
〈
N∏
j=1
(Anj + ω
n
2 Bnj )
〉
+C. C., (4)
where C. C. stands for complex conjugate.
From the classical viewpoint, the symbol 〈·〉 denotes
the statistical average over many runs. The theory of
local realism implies that,
B˜ ≤

d(2−
N
2 + 2−1)− 1, if N and d both are even
d(2−
N+1
2 + 2−1)− 1, if N is odd and d is even
d− 1, otherwise
In case of quantum mechanical description, the statisti-
cal average is replaced by quantum average on a given
state |ψ〉. The quantum expectation B˜q of B˜ takes
the maximum value (d − 1) i.e. B˜q ≤ (d − 1). One
can clearly see that the constraint on B imposed by
local realism, formally known as generic Bell inequal-
ity, is violated by quantum mechanics for an even di-
mensional system. In particular, the maximum quan-
tum violation is reached by a maximally entangled state
|ψ〉 = 1√
d
∑d−1
α=0 |α〉1 |α〉2 . . . |α〉N , and for the observable
7operators V̂ =
∑d−1
α=0 ω
α |α〉V V 〈α|, where V ∈ {A,B},
|α〉A =
∑d−1
β=0 ω
−αβ |β〉, |α〉B =
∑d−1
β=0 ω
−(α+ 12 )β |β〉 and
|α〉 is the eigen vector of generalized Z operator corre-
sponding to the eigen value ωα. Here Â and B̂ are the
quantum observable operators analogous to the classical
variable A and B.
For our purpose, we will use a slight different form of
the above Bell function (4), as:
B = 1
2N
d−1∑
n=1
〈
N∏
j=1
(Anj + ω
−n2 Bnj )
〉
+C. C.. (5)
One can easily verify that the classical and quantum
bounds for B are same as of B˜. Note that, to reach the
maximum violation of B, it is important to use an observ-
able B̂, with an eigen vector |α〉B =
∑d−1
β=0 ω
−(α− 12 )β |β〉,
corresponding to the eigen value ωα. By choosing Âj =
P0,j and B̂j = P1,j , one can rewrite the Bell function (5)
as:
B = 1
2N−1
d−1∑
n=1
∑
x∈{0,1}N
ω−nf(x)
〈
N∏
j=1
Pnxj ,j
〉
,
where xi ∈ {0, 1} is the ith bit of x, f : {0, 1}N →
{0, 1, . . . , d − 1,⊥} is a function such that it takes the
value ⊥ for half of the elements in the domain and
ω⊥ = 0.
APPENDIX B: PROOF OF THE THEOREMS
Theorem 5. In the absence of effective eavesdropping
the dealer’s secret can be perfectly reconstructed by the
participants for an honest implementation of secret dis-
tribution and recovery phase of the proposed scheme.
Proof. After passing the device independence test, for ev-
ery i ∈ [M ] with Ti = 0, Alice and Bobs share an N -
partite d-dimensional GHZ state |ψ〉i and each of them
measures their own particle along with generalized X-
operator. For simplicity, we will write |ψ〉 in place of
|ψ〉i. Now the operator of Alice and all Bobs together
can be expressed as
XA ⊗XB1 ⊗ . . .⊗XBN−1 =

 d−1∑
SA=0
ω
SA |SA〉0 0 〈SA|

 ⊗

 d−1∑
SB1
=0
ω
SB1
∣∣SB1〉0 0 〈SB1 ∣∣


⊗ . . .⊗

 d−1∑
SBN−1
=0
ω
SBN−1
∣∣∣SBN−1〉0 0
〈
SBN−1
∣∣∣


=
d−1∑
SA,SB1
,...,SBN−1
=0
ω
(
SA+SB1
+...+SBN−1
) ∣∣∣SASB1 . . . SBN−1〉0 0
〈
SASB1 . . . SBN−1
∣∣∣ .
And,
P =
〈
ψ
∣∣∣SASB1 . . . SBN−1〉0 0
〈
SASB1 . . . SBN−1
∣∣∣ψ〉
=
∣∣∣〈ψ|SASB1 . . . SBN−1〉0
∣∣∣2
=
1
dN−1
∣∣∣∣∣∣
d−1∑
α=0
ω
(
SA+SB1
+...SBN−1
)
α
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
=
{
1
dN−1
, if (SA + SB1 + . . . SBN−1) = 0
0, otherwise
Thus the condition to get a measurement result SA
from the observable XA and SBk from XBk (for k ∈ [N−
1]) by measuring the entangled state |ψ〉 with a nonzero
probability is (SA + SB1 + . . .+ SBN−1) = 0(mod d) i.e.,
N−1∑
k=1
SBk = −SA(mod d).
For a secret S, Alice declares S´ = S + SA(mod d). After
Alice’s declaration Bobs calculate
Sˆ = S´ +
N−1∑
k=1
SBk(mod d)
= S´ − SA(mod d)
= S(mod d).
Thus, in the absence of effective eavesdropping the
dealer’s secret can be perfectly reconstructed by the par-
ticipants by an honest implementation of secret distribu-
tion and recovery phase of the proposed scheme.
Theorem 6. The proposed scheme is ǫcor-correct for a
choice of the length of hash value ǫEC such that ǫEC ≥
logd
(
1
ǫcor
)
.
Proof. In the error correction phase of the scheme, Alice
picks a hash function h(·) from a family of two-universal
hash functions uniformly at random. Then, by the def-
inition of two-universal hash function, two hash values
8h(S) and h(Sˆ) will coincide for two different values of S
and Sˆ, with a probability atmost d−ǫEC , i.e.,
Pr(h(Sˆ) = h(S)|Sˆ 6= S) ≤ d−ǫEC .
Thus the probability that the scheme does not abort at
the error correction phase for Sˆ 6= S is atmost ǫcor for
a choice of ǫEC such that ǫEC > logd(
1
ǫcor
). Hence the
proposed scheme is ǫcor-correct.
Theorem 7. The proposed scheme is ǫc-complete for
ǫc > (1− µ(1 − exp(2η2)))M + η.
Proof. The proposed scheme can be aborted either in
testing phase or in error correction phase. The proba-
bility to abort in the testing phase is given by
Ptest = Pr
(∑
i
Ci < (pw − η)
∑
i
Ti
)
=
M∑
j=0
Pr
(∑
i
Ci < (pw − η)j|
∑
i
Ti = j
)
Pr
(∑
i
Ti = j
)
Devices are causally independent i.e., each use of de-
vice is independent of previous use, thus the random
variables Ci (i ∈ [M ]) are independently and iden-
tically distributed. The expectation value of Ci is
pw. Thus by using Hoeffding bound [65], we calculate
Pr(
∑
iCi < (pw − η)j|
∑
i Ti = j) < exp(−2η2j). As Ti
follows Bernoulli distribution with Pr(Ti = 1) = µ, then
Pr(
∑
Ti = j) =
(
M
j
)
µj(1− µ)M−j . Hence
Ptest =
M∑
j=0
(M
j
)
µ
j
(1− µ)M−j exp(−2η2j)
= (1− µ(1− exp(2η2)))M .
For the case of aborting in error correction phase, we
have assumed that the scheme has passed the testing
phase. Which implies that the particles are entangled
in the specified form and measurement devices are also
free from eavesdropping. In the previous theorem, we
have shown that in the absence of any active eavesdrop-
per the shared and the recovered secret is same except the
interference of noise and from the property of the hash
function, it is clear that if Sˆ = S, then h(Sˆ) = h(S).
Thus in case of honest implementation of the scheme,
the probability to abort in error correction phase (PEC)
is bounded above by the noise tolerance η i.e., PEC ≤ η.
Thus the total probability of aborting the protocol is
Pabort = Ptest + PEC
≤ (1− µ(1− exp(2η2)))M + η.
Hence the proposed protocol is ǫc-complete for ǫc > (1−
µ(1− exp(2η2)))M + η.
Theorem 8. For large M , Alice and Bobs can proceed
for the share distribution and reconstruction phases se-
curely if the testing phase of the proposed scheme is suc-
cessful.
Proof. In the proposed scheme, there is a one to one cor-
respondence between the entangled states {|ψ〉}Mi=1 and
the random bit string T = {T1 . . . TM} ∈ {0, 1}M in such
a way that, the entangled state |ψ〉i will be associated
with the testing phase for Ti = 1. For i ∈ [M ] such that
Ti = 1, we have defined a random variable Ci by: Ci = 1,
if they win the N -partite d-dimensional XOR game and
0 otherwise. Now, define C = 1∑
i Ti
(
∑M
i=0 Ci). Then
E(C) = pw. By applying Hoeffding bound [65], we get
that
Pr(|C − E(C)| ≥ δ) ≤ exp(−2δ2
∑
i
Ti) = ǫtest,
where ǫtest is a negligibly small positive value. Thus we
can express δ in term of ǫtest, i.e.,
δ =
√
1
2
∑
i Ti
ln
(
1
ǫtest
)
.
If possible, let us define Ci for Ti = 1 as above and
C´ = 1
M−∑i Ti (
∑
{Ti=0} Ci). Now from the corollary of
Serfling lemma [66, 67] we can reduce that Pr(|C − C´| ≥
λ) ≤ ǫqss, where ǫqss is a small quantity and
λ =
√
M(
∑
i Ti + 1)
2(
∑
i Ti)
2(M −∑i Ti) ln
(
1
ǫqss
)
.
As
∑
i Ti ≈ µM , then δ and λ will be very close to zero
for large M . Thus we can conclude that if a randomly
chosen subset of the entangled states pass the testing
phase of the proposed scheme, then the remaining entan-
gled states are in the desired form.
